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Resistance	to	Policy	Change	in	the	European	Union.			
An	actor-centred	analytical	framework		Amandine	Crespy,	CEVIPOL/IEE,	Université	libre	de	Bruxelles	
Institut	d'Etudes	Européennes,	ULB	Avenue	F.D.	Roosevelt,	39	B-1050	Bruxelles	CP	172	acrespy@ulb.ac.be		
Sabine	Saurugger,	Sciences	Po	Grenoble,	PACTE	Sciences	Po	Grenoble	BP	48	F-38040	GRENOBLE	Cedex	9	sabine.saurugger@sciencespo-grenoble.fr			Abstract	This	article	addresses	the	perspectives	and	limits	of	the	ever	expanding	research	agenda	of	various	forms	of	(active	or	passive)	resistance	to	EU	policy	change.	While	taking	stock	of	 existing	 research	 on	 Euroscepticism,	 social	 movements,	 Europeanisation	 and	 non-compliance,	 the	 paper	 seeks	 to	 go	 beyond	 their	 limitations	 and	 proposes	 a	 broader	analytical	framework.	This	framework	shall	serve	to	study	resistance	to	policy	change	in	the	 EU	 in	 three	 constitutive	 dimensions:	 its	 causes,	 its	 forms	 and	 its	 effects.	 We	formulate	four	hypotheses:	1/	a	“positive-negative	integration	hypothesis”	analysing	the	nature	 of	 change	 as	 a	 motivation	 for	 agents	 to	 resist;	 2/	 a	 “disposition	 hypothesis”	
2			
relating	 to	 the	 perception	 and	 framing	 of	 change;	 3/	 an	 “arena	 shifting	 hypothesis”	examining	 the	 institutional	 possibilities	 for	 resisting	 at	 the	 national	 or	 EU	 political	arena;	and	4/	a	 twofold	 “concentration	hypothesis”	 looking	at	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	concentration	 of	 resistance	 in	 one	 or	 few	 Member	 States	 is	 likely	 to	 affect	 further	integration	under	different	decision	making	regimes	(unanimity	or	qualified	majority).			Acknowledgments:	We	 would	 like	 to	 thank	 Tanja	 Börzel,	 Charlotte	 Halpern,	 Stella	 Ladi,	 Vivien	 Schmidt,	Claudia	 Schrag	 Sternberg,	 and	 Fabien	 Terpan	 for	 their	 very	 stimulating	 and	 valuable	comments	on	a	previous	draft	of	this	article.						Introduction		Resistance	 to	 European	 integration	 seems	 to	 be	 exacerbating.	 For	 more	 than	 twenty	years,	phenomena	such	as	citizen	protest	against	specific	European	policies,	 referenda	lost	over	the	ratification	of	treaties,	and,	more	recently	governments	whose	chances	of	re-election	decrease	because	of	 their	pro-European	position	have	 increasingly	been	 in	the	headlines.	Resistance	–	that	is	active	and	passive	opposition	to	European	integration	–	is	not	new.	It	has	mainly	been	analysed	in	two	distinct	perspectives:	first	by	studies	on	Euroscepticism	 and	 social	 movements,	 second	 by	 public	 policy	 approaches	 and	 legal	
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studies	 concentrating	 on	 inertia	 and	 non-compliance	 with	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 law.	However,	 the	perceived	 intensification	and	diversification	of	 this	 resistance	 calls	 for	 a	renewed	 interest	 in	 the	matter.	 The	 period	 of	 crisis	 in	 which	 the	 European	 Union	 is	currently	 undergoing	 makes	 these	 phenomena	 more	 visible,	 and	 broader:	 domestic	politics	is	no	longer	insulated	from	European	politics,	and	European	politics	is	no	longer	insulated	 from	domestic	politics.	Rather	 than	a	 two-level	game,	EU	multi-level	politics	now	take	the	form	of	a	“simultaneous	double	game”	where	decisions	are	the	EU	level	are	intertwined	with	and	shaped	by	domestic	politics	in	real	time,	as	reflected	by	the	media	in	 the	 interconnected	 national	 public	 spheres	 (Crespy	 and	 Schmidt	 2015).	 Decision	making	 does	 no	 longer	 be	 insulated	 in	 the	 secrecy	 of	 negotiations	 in	 the	 era	 of	“constraining	 dissensus”	 (Down	 and	 Wilson	 2008).	 While	 political	 science	 has	increasingly	 studied	 the	 interaction	 between	 policy	 and	 politics,	 or	 in	 other	 words	policy-making	and	partisan	politics,	 there	 is	not	yet	a	broad	analytical	 framework	that	offers	 the	 possibility	 to	 study	 this	 interaction,	 and	 hence	 the	 variables	 leading	 to	resistance	at	the	EU	level.		The	 starting	point	of	 this	 article	 is	 that	 the	perspectives	developed	 in	Euroscepticism,	social	 movements,	 Europeanisation	 and	 non-compliance	 studies,	 whilst	 crucial	 for	conceptualizing	 specific	 phenomena	 that	 have	 contradicted	 the	 idea	 of	 an	 irreversible	and	 ever	 deeper	 Union,	 are	 not	 entirely	 sufficient	 to	 understand	 the	 complexity	 of	contemporary	 resistance	 to	 European	 integration.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 studies	 of	Euroscepticism	 and	 transnational	 mobilisation	 have	 focused	 on	 political	 parties	 and	movements’	 strategies	 and	 identities,	 but	 have	 tended	 to	 overlook	 the	 role	 of	 policy	change	 in	driving	resistance.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	 literature	on	Europeanisation	has	
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investigated	 the	 role	 of	 domestic	 actors	 in	 facilitating	 rather	 than	 resisting	 policy	change.	 As	 far	 as	 research	 on	 inertia	 and	 non-compliance	 is	 concerned,	 it	 has	mostly	considered	resistance	to	the	implementation	of	European	law	and	dealt	with	resistance	to	 the	 various	 forms	 of	 EU	 induced	 policy	 change	 (soft	 law	 and	 new	 modes	 of	governance)	only	as	a	second	thought	(for	exceptions	see	Falkner	et	al	2005,	Saurugger	&	Terpan	2015).	Against	this	backdrop,	 this	article	aims	at	proposing	a	 framework	for	analysing	resistance	to	EU	induced	policy	change	(both	at	the	EU	and	national	level).		Our	perspective	relies	on	three	assumptions.	First,	beyond	principled	opposition	for	the	EU	 as	 a	 supranational	 polity,	 it	 is	 policy	 change	 induced	 by	 (or	 attributed	 to)	 EU	integration	 that	 triggers	 the	 most	 significant	 proportion	 of	 resistance	 today.	 We	therefore	object	to	the	artificial	distinction	between	resistance	to	EU	policies	and	the	EU	polity	as	we	consider	that	the	former	leads	to	the	latter.		Second,	 while	 non-political	 variables,	 such	 as	 resources	 or	 bureaucratic	 capacities,	certainly	 influence	 the	 degree	 of	 compliance	 with	 EU	 law,	 the	 bulk	 of	 resistance	attitudes	 to	 policy	 change	 in	 the	 EU	 are	 intrinsically	 political.	 This	 understanding	 of	resistance,	 while	 extremely	 wide-reaching,	 allows	 us	 to	 include	 attitudes	 of	 inertia	(passive	resistance)	and	retrenchment	(active	resistance)	under	one	heading	(Saurugger	and	Terpan	2015).	This	definition	offers	a	way	to	conceptualise	actors’	strategies	used	to	 resist	 obligations	 as	 well	 as	 opportunities	 offered	 by	 European	 norms.	 It	 does	 so	without	falling	in	the	trap	of	concept-stretching	(Sartori	1970)	as	these	notions	do	not	describe	different	degrees	of	but	two	different	types	of	activities	with	regard	to	the	same	phenomenon.	This	definition	leads	to	a	framework	that	implies	a	political	–	i.e.	conflict-	driven	–	definition	of	resistances	and	that	is	actor-	rather	than	variable-centred.			
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Empirical	 evidence	 shows	 that	 resistance	 can	 occur	 at	 all	 levels	 of	 government.	 To	understand	resistance	to	European	integration	in	all	 its	different	forms,	 it	 is	politics	 in	its	broad	sense,	 i.e.	achieving	power	exercised	by	a	wide	variety	of	actors	in	a	political	society,	that	must	be	studied.	Hence,	in	our	understanding,	resistance	is	actively	created	by	agents	rather	than	being	the	mere	result	of	structural	misfit	at	the	domestic	level.		Third,	 resistance	 occurs	 at	 all	 stages	 of	 the	 policy	 cycle,	 be	 it	 at	 the	 stage	 of	 agenda	setting	 or	 policy	 formulation	 when	 actors	 resist	 particular	 ways	 of	 framing	 policy	problems	or	uploading	policy	models	or	at	the	stage	of	evaluation	where	the	detrimental	impact	 of	 the	 Europeanisation	 of	 certain	 policy	 domains	 can	 feed	 contestation.	 This	article	focuses	on	resistance	during	the	agenda	setting,	formulation	and	implementation	phase,	 namely	 upstream	 and	 downstream	 of	 decision	 making	 –	 as	 resistance	 in	 the	decision-making	sequence	are	widely	analysed	by	legislative	studies	(see	the	European	Legislative	Policy	Research	Group	(ELPRG)	www.elprg.eu).		This	article	is	structured	as	follows:	In	the	first	section,	we	identify	the	shortcomings	in	the	existing	literature	and	outline	our	actor-centred	approach.	In	the	second	section	we	formulate	 four	 hypotheses	 explaining	 the	 causes,	 forms	 and	 effects	 of	 resistance	 to	policy	 change	 in	 the	 EU:	 1)	 the	 “positive-negative	 integration	 hypothesis”,	 2)	 a	“disposition	 hypothesis”,	 3)	 an	 arena	 shifting	 hypothesis”	 and	 4)	 a	 two-fold	“concentration	 hypothesis”.	 While	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 article	 is	 not	 empirical,	 we	illustrate	our	hypotheses	with	references	to	issues	in	EU	politics	and	policy-making.			
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Resistance	and	policy	change:	recasting	the	scholarly	debate	
Resistance	to	European	integration,	defined	as	active	or	passive	forms	of	opposition	to	European	policies,	politics	and	polity,	are	not	new	phenomena	(Crespy	and	Verschueren	2009).	They	have	been	analysed	over	the	past	twenty	years	 in	four	strings	of	research	which	 have	 remained	 unconnected:	 research	 in	 political	 sociology	 on	 Euroscepticism	and	 transnational	 protest,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 studies	 of	 Europeanisation	 and	 non-compliance	 in	 public	 policy	 analysis,	 on	 the	 other.	 This	 section	 aims	 at	 recasting	 the	scholarly	 debate	 in	 terms	 in	 two	 ways:	 first,	 we	 show	 how	 the	 connection	 between	policy	and	resistance	to	EU	integration	has	largely	remained	a	blind	spot	in	the	existing	conceptualisations	 of	 resistance	 to	 policy	 change	 in	 the	 EU;	 second,	 we	 propose	 an	actor-centred	approach	inspired	by	political	sociology	as	the	theoretical	ground	for	our	framework.			
From	Euroscepticism	to	resistance:	political	sociology	The	 pioneering	 literature	 tackling	 opposition	 to	 Europe	 is	 focused	 on	 the	 notion	 of	Euroscepticism.	It	is	generally	argued	that	the	end	of	the	so-called	permissive	consensus	has	 allowed	 for	 mass–level	 (Franklin	 et	 al.	 1995;	 Hurrelman	 2007;	 de	 Vries	 and	Steenbergen	2013)	as	well	as	party	based	Euroscepticism	(Taggart	1998;	Szczerbiak	and	Taggart	 2003,	 2008).	 ‘Closed	 shops	 of	 government	 leaders,	 interest	 groups	 and	Commission	 officials	 have	 been	 bypassed	 as	 European	 issues	 have	 entered	 party	competition’	(Hooghe	and	Marks	2009):	9).		
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With	regard	to	mass-level	Euroscepticism,	research	has	concentrated	on	public	opinion	and	 the	variables	 that	determine	 levels	of	 support	 for	European	 integration,	 including	material,	 cognitive,	 value-based	 and	 political	 variables	 (Gabel	 1998;	 Mc	 Laren	 2002;	Eichenberg	 and	Dalton	2007;	 Ingelhart	 2008).	More	 recently,	 research	has	 found	 that	indifference	 rather	 than	 hostility	 could	 describe	 the	 attitude	 of	 the	 general	 public	towards	the	EU	(Duchesne	et	al.	2013).	In	this	sense,	the	permissive	consensus	that	has	allowed	 elites	 to	 govern	 EU	 politics	without	 the	 influence	 of	 citizens	 has	 not	 entirely	disappeared.		The	 bulk	 of	 Euroscepticism	 studies	 are,	 however,	 linked	 to	 party-based	 explanations.	Since	the	seminal	article	by	Paul	Taggart	in	1998,	this	perspective	has	generated	a	vast	body	 of	 literature	 (for	 an	 overview	 see	 Leconte	 2010).	 Starting	 from	 the	 distinction	between	hard	and	soft	Euroscepticism,	authors	have	put	forward	numerous	definitions	and	typologies	for	the	phenomenon.	Strategy	related	to	domestic	party	competition	and	ideology	are	the	main	variables	highlighted	in	this	literature.	One	central	claim	has	been	that	political	parties	 tend	 to	be	more:	 the	patterns	of	Euroscepticism	would	 therefore	overlap	 the	 government-opposition	dynamics	 (Sitter	 2001).	 Another	 group	of	 authors	has	 concentrated	 more	 recently	 on	 how	 Euroscepticism	 is	 rooted	 in	 national	institutions,	 histories	 and	 cultures	 (Harmsen	 and	 Spiering	 2004;	 Lacroix	 and	 Coman	2007;	Lacroix	and	Nicolaïdis	2010;	Hobolt	and	Tilley	2014)	thus	depicting	idiosyncratic	forms	of	resistances	to	EU	integration.		The	 distinction	 between	 opposition	 to	 European	 policies	 and	 opposition	 to	 the	European	polity,	or,	in	other	words,	the	European	integration	itself	has	often	been	used.	However,	the	definition	of	opposition	to	the	European	polity	has	turned	out	to	be	very	
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problematic,	as	opinions	diverge	as	to	precisely	what	the	European	polity	exactly	is.	For	example,	the	definition	of	specific	support	for	the	European	polity	as	support	for	“the	EU	as	 it	 is	 and	 as	 it	 is	 developing”	 put	 forward	 by	 Mudde	 and	 Kopecky	 (2002)	 appears	impossible	 to	 operationalize	 since	 it	 is	 precisely	 here	 that	 resistance	 and	 contention	crystalize.	The	dichotomy	between	resistance	to	EU	policies	and	resistance	to	European	integration	 per	 se	 is	 similarly	 often	 misleading	 and	 has	 obscured	 the	 intertwining	 of	both.	Many	policy	areas	are	symbolic	for	constitutive	dimensions	of	the	regime	because	they	define	the	boundaries	of	the	polity.		Finally,	research	on	collective	action	and	social	movements	has	increasingly	focused	on	resistance	 to	 European	 integration	 (Imig	 and	 Tarrow	 2001).	 Here,	 it	 is	 especially	 the	global	justice	movement	and	trade	unions	who	have	criticized	the	neo-liberal	bias	of	the	EU	(Bieler	2005;	della	Porta	2006).	The	policy	dimension	has	been	narrowed	down	to	certain	 specific	 issues,	 such	 as	 the	 Lisbon	 strategy,	 the	 regulation	 on	 genetically	modified	 organisms	 or	 chemicals	 has	 triggered	 loud	 dissent	 (Parks	 2015).	 This	literature,	however,	has	been	more	 interested	 in	 the	 transnationalisation	of	protest	 in	
the	 EU	 rather	 than	 in	 resistance	 to	 the	 EU	 (della	 Porta	 and	 Caiani	 2011).	 All	 in	 all,	political	 sociology	has	 focused	on	 the	 study	of	 the	 resisting	actors	but	has	overlooked	the	importance	of	policy	change	in	explaining	the	causes,	and	effects	of	such	resistance.			The	 crucial	 weakness	 of	 this	 literature	 is	 that	 the	 policy	 dimension	 remains	 largely	overlooked.	 As	 the	 established	 analytical	 categories	 have	 proved	 less	 and	 less	 useful,	some	scholars	have	re-conceptualised	Euroscepticism	as	discourse	(Trenz	and	de	Wilde	2012)	 or,	 for	 example,	 as	 a	 more	 “mainstream”	 phenomenon	 linked	 to	 populism	
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(Leconte	2015),	 thus	 keeping	 the	 focus	on	politics.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	EU	lacks	 institutional	 mechanisms	 to	 translate	 mass	 preferences	 directly	 into	 policy	outcomes	(Franklin	and	Wlezien	1997;	Hobolt	and	Tilley	2013).	While	policy	issues	are	often	mentioned	as	a	motivation	for	resisting,	our	ambition	is	to	go	further	by	proposing	hypothesis	 linking	 policy	 change	 and	 resistance	 as	 well	 as	 by	 exploring	 the	 policy	consequences	of	such	resistance.		
From	policy	change	to	resistance	to	change:	Europeanisation	research		Concentrating	 more	 on	 policies	 than	 on	 politics,	 the	 Europeanisation	 literature	 has	mainly	focused	on	change,	thus	connecting	with	the	wider	policy	literature	that	seeks	to	identify	 mechanisms	 and	 variables	 explaining	 both	 incremental	 and	 dramatic	 policy	change.	In	this	literature,	domestic	actors	and	structures	are	conceived	as	facilitators	or	mediators	 of	 EU	 policy	 implementation	 at	 the	 national	 level	 (Börzel	 and	Risse	 2000);	(Radaelli	2003).	Resistance	has	largely	been	indirectly	addressed	when	domestic	actors	turned	 out	 to	 be	 veto	 players	 and	 rather	 than	 facilitators.	 A	 specific	 subfield	 of	 the	literature	on	Europeanisation	has	concentrated	on	the	uses	of	Europe	(Jacquot	and	Woll	2010)	and	has	put	the	emphasis	on	the	strategic,	cognitive	and	legitimizing	motivations	for	actors	to	promote	Europeanisation	in	different	ways.			Studies	 on	 non-change	 or	 resistance	 to	 change	 can	 be	more	 specifically	 found	 in	 the	literature	 on	 non-compliance.	 At	 the	 outset,	 studies	 of	 compliance	 as	 well	 as	 non-compliance	were	concerned	with	 the	 issue	of	 convergence	between	EU	 laws	and	 their	implementation	at	the	national	level.	European	directives	and	regulations	were	initially	
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considered	 to	 be	 relatively	 a-political	 and	 the	 efficiency	 of	 implementation	 was	addressed	 in	 terms	 of	 efficiency	 and	 capacity	 of	 national	 administrations:	 the	 quicker	the	 legislative	 procedures,	 the	 more	 efficient	 the	 implementation	 of	 EU	 law	 (for	 an	overview	see	Falkner	2004;	Treib	2003).		By	the	end	of	 the	1990s,	 the	different	degrees	of	 implementation	became	a	dependent	variable	 explained	 by	 institutional	 configurations	 as	 well	 as	 intermediating	 or	facilitating	 factors	 (Duina	 1999;	 Börzel	 2000;	 Caporaso	 et	 al.	 2001).	 The	 literature	identified	four	possible	outcomes:	absorption,	transformation,	retrenchment,	and	inertia	(Börzel	 2001;	 Risse	 et	 al	 2001;	 Héritier	 and	 Knill	 2001).	 While	 absorption	 and	transformation	 describe	 degrees	 of	 policy	 change,	 retrenchment	 and	 inertia	 refer	 to	different	degrees	of	non-change.		Retrenchment	is	an	active	transformation	process	right	from	the	start	(Héritier	and	Knill	2001).	Radaelli	(2003)	calls	this	form	a	paradox	insofar	as	domestic	policies	become	less	European	 than	 they	 initially	 were.	 Here,	 opposition	 to	 European	 decisions	 allows	coalitions	to	be	created	at	the	domestic	level	that	impose	reforms	that	are	diametrically	opposed	to	those	decided	at	the	EU	level.	In	 a	 situation	 of	 inertia,	 European	 norms	 do	 not	 trigger	 any	 transformation	 at	 the	national	level.	Inertia	may	take	multiple	forms,	such	as	lags,	delays	in	the	transposition	of	 directives	 (Radaelli	 2003),	 or	 explicit	 forms	 of	 resistance	 such	 as	 strikes,	 social	movements	 or	 direct	 activism.	 The	 sustainability	 of	 inertia	 as	 a	 long-term	 strategy	 is,	however,	 problematic.	 A	 long-term	 opposition	may	 lead	 to	 a	 crisis,	 and	 thus	 usher	 in	radical	 change.	 Another	 possibility	 might	 be	 an	 ad	 hoc	 arrangement	 of	 the	 system,	
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allowing	 for	 opting	 out	 strategies	 the	 EU	 has	 long	 experienced	 (Social	 Charter,	 EMU,	Schengen).	Research	 on	 inertia	 and	 retrenchment	 is	 mostly	 associated	 with	 the	 literature	 on	compliance	 or	 non-compliance	 with	 EU	 law.	 The	 bulk	 of	 non-compliance	 studies	 are	anchored	 in	 either	qualitative	 case	 study	 research	 (Falkner	 et	 al	 2005,	Tallberg	2002,	Panke	2007),	based	on	mixed	methods	(Kaeding	2007)	or	quantitative	research	design	(Mastenbroek	 2005,	 Börzel	 et	 al	 2007,	 König	 &	 Luetgert	 2009).	 Based	 on	 the	comparative	analysis	of	quantitative	research	undertaken	in	this	field,	Toshkov	(2010)	offers	 a	 comprehensive	 typology	 of	 variables	 affecting	 non-compliance.1	 He	distinguishes	 between	 variables	 that	 (across	 different	 research	 projects)	 affect	compliance	 positively:	 administrative	 efficiency,	 parliamentary	 scrutiny	 and	coordination	 strength;	 and	 variables	 that	 exert	 a	 negative	 (or	 non-positive)	 influence:	Decentralized/Centralized	decision	making,	corruption	levels,	veto	players	(both	public	and	 private),	 and	 domestic	 conflict.	 These	 variables	 influence	 the	 degree	 of	 active	 as	well	as	passive	opposition	(Falkner	2005).	In	this	research,	types	of	active	opposition	or	inertia	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 opposition	 to	 specific	 content	 of	 EU	 law,	 to	 the	 EU	decision	 mode	 or	 to	 the	 national	 transposition	 mode.	 Passive	 inertia	 refers	 to	administrative	problems	or	political	instability.		Here,	besides	non-political	variables,	authors	clearly	point	 to	 the	crucial	 role	of	actors	and	conflict	over	EU	legislation.	However,	this	literature	treats	actors	(their	number	and	their	 nature)	 as	 variables	 and	 only	 implicitly,	 at	 best,	 investigates	 political	 and	administrative	 actors’	motivation	 for	 resisting,	 i.e.	 in	 this	 case,	 not	 implementing.	 The	wider	 context,	 such	 as	 the	 cognitive	 frame	 in	which	 these	 actors	 evolve,	 the	 national	
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mood	 or	 specific	 exogenous	 events	 (such	 as	 international	 crises	 for	 example),	 are	conceptualised	 as	 variables.	 Furthermore,	 we	 know	 that	 not	 only	 directives	 and	regulations	trigger	opposition,	but	also	more	general	principles	and	programs	stemming	from	 the	 EU	 level	 which	 must	 thus	 be	 included	 amongst	 the	 policy	 issues	 triggering	resistance.			
An	actor-centred	approach		Our	 approach	 puts	 agency	 at	 the	 centre.	 However,	 it	 considers	 various	 political	 and	social	 actors	 as	potential	 agents	of	 resistance	 rather	 than	 facilitators	of	 change.	 It	 has	been	 argued	 elsewhere	 that	 scholarship	 on	 Europeanisation	 focused	 excessively	 on	agents	 as	 agents	 of	 change	whereas,	 in	 reality,	 there	was	 not	 automatic	 or	 clear	 link	between	 agency	 and	 structural	 change	 in	 the	 process	 of	 EU	 integration	 (Coman	 and	Crespy	 2015).	 The	Euro	 crisis	 has	 revealed	 that,	 in	 a	 policy	 area	 that	was	 considered	amongst	 the	greatest	achievements	of	EU	 integration,	namely	a	common	currency,	 the	Europeanisation	of	monetary	policy	failed	to	trigger	the	proper	adaptation	of	economic	structures	 in	 a	 number	 of	member	 states.	 Similarly,	 in	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe,	 a	number	of	political	actors	 is	resisting	the	establishment	of	democratic	 institutions	and	politics	conveyed	by	the	EU,	as	the	controversy	about	constitutional	reform	in	Hungary	has	 epitomized.	 Hence,	 our	 approach	 is	 in	 tune	 with	 the	 sociological	 approach	 to	Europeanisation	 (see	 Saurugger	 2009),	 for	 example	 when	 focusing	 on	 the	 “usages	 of	Europe”	 (Jacquot	 and	 Woll	 2003).	 However,	 by	 studying	 the	 strategic,	 cognitive,	 or	legitimizing	usages	of	Europe,	Jacquot	and	Woll	tend	to	focus	on	agents	motivations	and	self-serving	 strategies.	 Similarly,	 we	 consider	 that	 no	 EU	 policy	 issue	 is	 intrinsically	
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technical	or	political.	Rather,	agents	frame	issues,	and	by	doing	so	aim	at	making	sense	of	Eu	policies	and	actions	(Jullien	and	Smith	2008).		Our	ambition	 is	 to	connect	better	agents’	motivations	and	actions	to	their	 institutional	environment,	defined	either	as	the	type	of	policy	change	that	they	react	to,	or	in	terms	of	possibilities	for	mobilisation,	or	institutional	opportunity	structure.	Thus,	we	propose	in	the	following	section	four	hypotheses	aims	at	looking	closer	at	the	connection	between	connect	agents’	motivations	and	policy	change.	Only	a	research	agenda	dealing	with	all	three	questions:	why,	how	and	with	which	effects	actors	resist	EU	policies	will	allow	us	to	 go	 beyond	 existing	 studies,	 either	 concentrating	 on	 Euroscepticism,	 social	movements,	or	Europeanisation	or	non-compliance	with	EU	law.	As	we	have	seen	above,	the	question	as	to	why	various	actors	resist	European	integration	has	been	central	in	the	literature.	 However,	 this	why	 question	must	 be	 linked	 to	 the	 object	 of	 resistance,	 i.e.	
what	exactly	actors	are	 resisting	and	how	 actors	are	 resisting.	As	an	attempt	 to	 tackle	this	 problem,	 we	 propose	 that,	 when	 resistance	 is	 mainly	 fed	 by	 policy	 change,	 such	change	 can	 be	 conceptualized	 in	 two	 complementary	 perspectives:	 a)	 in	 terms	 of	 the	(objective)	direction	of	change	entailed	by	reform	or	Europeanisation	and	b)	as	agency’s	(subjective)	 perception	 and	 framing	 of	 such	 change.	 Furthermore,	we	 attempt	 to	 link	resistances	 and	 policy	 change	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 feed-back	 loops	 and	 thus	 answer	 the	question	how	citizens’	resistance	in	the	large	sense	influences	policy	making	at	the	EU	level.			
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Causes,	 forms	 and	 effects	 of	 resistance	 to	 policy	 change:	 four	
hypotheses	
	
Unpacking	the	nature	of	policy	change	The	literature	on	policy	or	institutional	change	has	theorized	the	degree	and	the	pace	of	change	while	focusing	on	critical	junctures	or,	on	the	contrary,	on	incremental	forms	of	change	 (e.g.	 Streeck	 and	Thelen	2005;	 Thelen	 and	Mahoney	2010).	 But	 they	 have	not	theorized	about	 the	direction	of	 change,	 i.e.	 the	 substantive	nature	of	proposed	policy	reforms,	 which	 is	 a	 main	 element	 driving	 agency	 motivation	 to	 facilitate	 or,	 on	 the	contrary,	to	resist	change.		The	nature	of	policy	change	has	been	grasped	by	the	distinction	between	negative	and	positive	 integration	 introduced	 by	 F.	 Scharpf	 (1999)	 in	 European	 studies.	 Negative	integration	implies	horizontal	integration	through	the	removal	of	national	rules,	which	are	seen	as	obstacles	to	the	building	of	a	transnational	policy	field.	The	building	of	the	common	market	 ruled	by	 the	 four	 freedoms	 (free	 circulation	of	 goods,	 people,	 capital	and	 services)	 is	 the	 typical	 illustration	 of	 negative	 integration.	 Positive	 integration	involves	the	setting	up	of	common	policies	and	instruments	at	the	European	level.	The	Common	 Agricultural	 Policy	 or	 the	 Monetary	 Union	 are	 typical	 examples	 of	 positive	integration.		However,	 from	an	analytical	point	of	view,	 the	contrast	between	positive	and	negative	integration	is	not,	or	is	not	any	longer,	as	stark	as	has	often	been	assumed.	Empirically,	these	two	types	of	change	are	not	mutually	exclusive.	In	fact,	most	policies	account	for	a	policy	mix	 containing	 elements	 of	 both	 negative	 and	 positive	 integration	 (removal	 of	
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national	 regulatory	 barriers	 from	 old	 policy	 practices	 accompanied	 by	 new	 policy	instruments).	The	specific	combination	in	each	policy	field	can	nevertheless	be	located	closer	 to	 one	 of	 the	 poles	 or	 in	 the	 middle.	 Asylum	 policy,	 for	 example,	 constitutes	positive	integration,	which	nevertheless	remains	weak	since	common	rules	are	limited	to	 common	minimum	 standards	 for	 asylum	 seeker	 reception.	 Besides,	 all	 other	 rules,	instruments	and	resources	remain	decentralized.		It	 is	therefore	useful	to	further	disentangle	what	 is	at	stake	with	positive	and	negative	integration	by	conceiving	policy	change	in	a	two-dimensional	way.	As	change	affects	the	degree	of	centralisation	of	competences	at	the	EU	level,	it	can	be	defined	when	looking	at	formal	competences,	but	also	informal	rules,	policy	instruments	and	resources	at	the	level	of	EU	or	national	and	regional	authorities.	Competition	within	the	internal	market,	for	example,	can	be	regarded	as	fairly	centralized	as	 it	 is	ruled	by	the	EU	Commission,	which	has	an	exclusive	competence	 for	decision	making	as	well	as	 implementation.	 In	contrast,	health	policy,	for	example,	can	be	considered	to	be	a	decentralized	policy.	Here	the	EU’s	competence	is	rather	residual.	Most	rules	and	resources	remain	located	at	the	national	and	regional	 level.	This	dimension	reflects	the	fundamental	functional	 logic	of	the	EU	where	competence	devolution	occurs	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	It	can	be	assessed	by	looking	at	the	formal	status	of	the	EU	competences	(exclusive,	shared	or	residual)	in	the	 treaties,	 which	 often	 goes	 hand-in-hand	 with	 the	 binding	 nature	 of	 policy	instruments.	 	On	the	other	hand,	policy	change	also	affects	the	balance	between	States	and	 markets’	 weight	 and	 prerogatives.	 Liberalisation	 directives,	 for	 instance,	 while	opening	 national	 markets	 to	 foreign	 competitors	 also	 involve	 deregulation,	 i.e.	 the	
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suppression	 of	 national	 rules	 and,	 consequently,	 the	 loss	 of	 State	 control	 over	 some	activities	on	its	territory.		Thus,	negative	 integration	can	be	understood	as	a	 logic	of	policy	 change	 that	puts	 the	emphasis	 on	 market	 freedom	 with	 very	 limited	 re-regulation	 at	 the	 European	 level.	From	a	 legal	point	of	view,	 it	 relies	on	mutual	recognition	of	 the	Member	States’	rules	rather	 than	harmonisation	Europe-wide.	Positive	 integration,	on	 the	 contrary,	 is	more	likely	to	imply	centralisation	and	market	(re)regulation.		In	most	policy	areas,	however,	strong	centralisation	and	regulation	are	not	any	 longer	very	 likely	 (Bickerton	 et	 al.	 2015).	 The	 new	 instruments	 for	 macro-economic	governance	set	up	in	the	aftermath	of	the	financial	and	debt	crisis	are	an	example	of	very	incremental	 change	 towards	 positive	 integration.	 Market	 integration	 through	liberalisation,	for	instance,	has	also	generated	resistance	from	social	groups.	At	the	same	time,	 as	we	 see	with	 the	 recent	 refugees’	 crisis,	 it	 has	been	 easier	 to	 remove	national	borders	within	the	Schengen	area	than	it	is	to	set	up	a	genuine	common	migration	and	asylum	 policy.	 	 While	 this	 makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 distinguish	 as	 clearly	 as	 did	 Scharpf	between	positive-negative	 integration,	 there	 still	 remains	 a	 two	dimensional	model	 of	policy	change	in	the	EU,	which	must	be	based	on	a	continuum	where	we	see	mixed	types	of	 integration.	 Scharpf’s	 distinction	 remains	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 our	 hypothesis	which	will	however	 be	 specified	 through	 the	 concepts	 of	 perception	 and	 framing,	 as	we	will	 see	below.			
H1:	 Echoing	 F.	 Scharpf,	 we	 hypothesize	 that	 positive	 integration	 is,	 by	 nature,	 more	likely	to	trigger	resistance	than	negative	 integration	(the	 ‘positive-negative	 integration	hypothesis’).		
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Perceptions	and	framing	of	policy	change	Our	conflict-driven	and	actor-centred	conception	of	resistance	to	policy	change	leads	us	to	argue	that	the	nature	of	resistances	cannot	simply	and	mechanically	be	inferred	from	the	nature	of	change.	Rather,	there	is	a	great	deal	of	‘political	work’	done	by	coalitions	of	actors	to	(discursively)	construct,	or	frame	change	as	a	problem.	This,	we	argue,	mainly	relies	on	actors’	 representations	of	 the	 implications	of	EU	policy	 and	 their	 connection	with	broader	normative	conceptions	of	EU	integration.	The	 Eurocrisis,	 in	 particular,	 shows	 that	 this	 framing	 dimension	 is	 of	 existential	importance	for	the	EU.	Beyond	nationalist	movements	and	sections	of	the	population	it	is	primarily	the	–	negatively	perceived	–	impact	of	EU	integration	on	national	societies	that	 feeds	 hostility	 towards	 the	 EU.	 This	 is	 illustrated	 by	 Euroscepticism	 in	 Germany	which	 essentially	 took	 the	 form	 of	 hostility	 towards	 the	 common	 currency	 renamed	
Teuro	(Busch	and	Knelangen	2005).		Marks	 and	Hooghe	 (2009)	 have	 compellingly	 argued	 that	 Europe	 has	 entered	 a	 post-functional	 era	 where	 politicisation	 of	 European	 issues	 brings	 about	 constraints	 and	incentives	 for	 political	 leaders.	 Thus,	 discourse	 about	 EU	 integration	 has	 increasingly	affected	the	dynamics	of	policy	change	over	the	past	two	decades	(Schmidt	and	Radaelli	2004).	Hence,	when	analysing	resistance	in	EU	politics	during	the	agenda	setting	and	the	implementation	phase,	both	arguments	must	actually	be	combined:	while	contestation	remains	 weak	 at	 the	 EU	 level	 and	 day-to-day	 European	 policy	 making	 might	 be	perceived	as	technocratic	rather	than	dependent	on	party	politics,	studies	have	shown	show	 how	 much	 expertise	 and	 politicisation	 became	 intertwined	 (Radaelli	 1999;	
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Saurruger	2002)	and	 the	European	Union’s	games	actually	became	politicized,	both	at	the	EU	(Follesdal	and	Hix	2006)	and	the	domestic	level	(Treib	2003;	Keading	2008).	Due	to	its	governance	system,	politics	 in	the	EU	are	intrinsically	multi-level.	Resistance	can	occur	at	all	 levels	of	governments	and	at	different	stages	of	the	policy	making	process,	and	cannot	only	be	linked	to	a	structural	misfit	hypothesis	at	the	domestic	level.		Political	conflicts	can	take	place	at	the	domestic,	but	also	at	the	European	level,	and	are	not	only	based	on	party	politics,	left-right	or	pro-	and	anti-European	cleavages,	but	also	other	forms	of	collective	action	(advocacy	coalitions,	transnational	networks).		Immigration	 policy,	 for	 example,	 has	 become	 one	 of	 the	 most	 rapidly	 Europeanized	policy	areas	which	is	politically	salient	and	sensitive	at	the	national	level.	The	intricacy	of	 national	 competences	 regarded	 as	 the	 prerogatives	 of	 the	 sovereign	 State,	 and	European	 rules	 stemming	 from	 the	 Schengen	 agreement	 and	 the	 free	 circulation	 of	persons	 have	 produced	 successive	 clashes:	 over	 the	 past	 few	 years,	 France	 expelled	from	 its	 territory	 Tunisian	 immigrants	 coming	 from	 Italy	 and	 has	 been	 leading	 an	offensive	 policy	 towards	 the	 Roma	 population.	 Germany	 fought	 and	won	 a	 relentless	battle	 against	 free	 circulation	 of	 workers	 from	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 European	 new	Member	States	and,	more	recently,	British	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron	criticized	the	once	 accepted	 working	 immigrants	 from	 those	 same	 countries.	 In	 this	 debate,	 the	advocates	of	an	‘open’	and	‘multicultural’	Europe	resist	and	denounce	the	building	of	a	‘fortress	 Europe’,	 a	 debate	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 current	 immigration	 crisis	 Europe	 is	experiencing.	 This	 tension	 clearly	 shapes	 policy	 change	 in	 the	 field	 as	 the	 European	Commission,	 among	 others,	 endeavours	 to	 conciliate	 in	 its	 discourse	 and	 policy	initiatives	the	two	conflicting	ideas	of	the	European	polity	(Caviedes	2004).	
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Another	 telling	 example	 is	 the	 conflict	 between	 a	 ‘social	 Europe’	 vs	 a	 ‘(neo)-liberal	Europe’	 used	 to	 contest	 EU	 initiatives	 in	 many	 policy	 areas	 that	 relate	 to	 market	regulation	and,	more	generally,	the	nature	of	capitalism	in	Europe.	While	it	still	strongly	resonates	 today,	 these	 master	 frames	 are	 far	 from	 new.	 As	 historical	 studies	 have	demonstrated,	these	conflicting	frames	were	already	used	by	trade	union	organisations	in	the	early	days	of	integration,	for	example	to	contest	the	‘liberal	turn’	leading	to	a	loss	of	 institutional	power	 in	the	shift	 from	the	European	Coal	and	Steel	Community	to	the	Treaty	of	Rome	 in	 the	 late	1950s,	or	when	they	demonstrated	 to	promote	a	European	status	 for	 miners	 in	 the	 early	 1960s	 (Verschueren	 2010).	 More	 recently,	 the	 same	frames	have	been	invoked	by	left-wing	protagonists	to	resist	the	development	of	various	liberalisation	 directives	 or	 their	 implementation	 (Port	 Services	 directive,	 Postal	directive,	 etc.),	 and	not	at	 least	 in	 the	context	of	 the	EU’s	bailout	 strategies	 in	 Ireland,	Portugal	 and	 Greece.	 A	 further	 example	 in	 this	 area	 is	 the	 framing	 and	 re-framing	strategies	 in	debates	 about	 the	 flexicurity	 agenda	promoted	by	 the	EU	Commission	 in	which,	 for	 instance,	unions	 tried	 to	promote	 the	 ‘Danish	model’	as	a	social	democratic	alternative	to	neoliberal	reforms	of	labour	markets	(Caune	2013).		Although	these	discursive	strategies	for	resisting	policy	change	are	obvious	when	they	touch	upon	highly	salient	policy	 issues	or	during	moments	of	conflict	and	polarisation	(Jabko	2013),	 they	are	 also	 relevant	 to	 study	 resistance	 to	policy	 change	along	 longer	periods	 of	 time	 and	 when	 European	 policy	 debates	 are	 not	 necessarily	 in	 the	 news.	Regarding	the	Common	Agricultural	Policy	(CAP),	the	productivist	discourse	focused	on	Europe	 has	 slowly	 been	 complemented	 by	 the	 idea	 that	 agriculture	 plays	 a	 crucial	environmental	 role.	 The	 EU	 Commission	 has	 consistently	 promoted	 the	 concept	 of	
20			
multi-functionality	 to	 promote	 reform	 (Fouilleux	 2004).	 In	 the	 recent	 debates	 about	reforming	 the	 CAP,	 a	 further	 ‘greening	 of	 the	 CAP’	 involving	 constraining	 policy	instruments	 is	 a	major	 bone	 of	 contention.	 The	 protagonists	 who	 resist	 this	 path	 for	policy	change,	be	they	parties,	administrations	or	interest	groups,	state	that	radical	shift	of	 instruments	 and	 resources	 towards	 the	 green	 pillar	 would	 threaten	 the	competitiveness	of	 the	EU’s	agricultural	 sector.	The	debt	crisis	 the	EU	has	been	 facing	over	 the	 past	 few	 years	 has	 generated	new	 representations	 and	 frames	 that	motivate	resistance	 to	policy	responses	 to	 the	crisis.	The	members	of	national	parliaments	who	refused	to	approve	austerity	plans	(and	corollary	conditionality)	clearly	denounced	the	‘Europe	of	austerity’	in	the	name	of	a	‘Europe	of	solidarity’	(Maatsch	and	Closa	2012).		These	examples	allow	us	to	formulate	our	second	hypothesis.		
H2:		We	argue	that	the	greater	the	distance	between	actor’s	frames	and	the	policy	goal	to	be	achieved,	the	higher	the	resistance	actors	exert	(Zahariadis	2008).	A	great	distance	does	not,	as	argued	by	the	misfit	hypothesis,	necessarily	increase	adaptational	pressure	and	 hence	 trigger	 greater	 change;	 it	 may	 also,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 generate	 greater	resistance	and	impede	change	(‘disposition	hypothesis’)	(Saurugger	and	Terpan	2015).		Investigating	 the	 nature	 of	 change,	 both	 in	 its	 objective	 and	 subjective	 dimensions,	 is	therefore	key	to	explaining	the	causes	of	resistance.		
Forms	and	arenas	of	resistance	Agents	are	at	 the	main	driving	 force	behind	resistance	 to	EU	 integration.	Autonomous	actors,	 they	 also	 respond	 to	 incentives	 created	 by	 their	 institutional	 environment.	Research	 on	 social	movements	 and	 interest	 groups	 has	 long	 established	 that	 interest	
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representation	 tends	 to	 adapt	 to	 the	 institutional	 environment	 and	 channels	 for	 voice	being	made	available	in	a	particular	polity.	This	has	been	theorized	in	terms	of	political	opportunity	structures	(see	e.g.	Kitschelt	1986,	Koopmans	1999).		The	specific	political	opportunity	structures	at	the	EU	level	have	induced	change	in	both	interest	 group	 and	 social	 movement	 structures.	 The	 bureaucratic	 functioning	 of	European	Union	has	 led	 to	 the	domestication	of	conflict	and	 the	professionalisation	of	interest	representation	by	the	“organised	civil	society”	in	Brussels.	This	process	also	has	broader	implications.	As	Mair	(Mair	2007)	has	underlined,	if	resistance	to	policy	change	cannot	be	voiced	and	considered	in	institutional	arenas,	for	instance	because	the	EU	is	deprived	of	 formal	parliamentary	opposition	–	 then	 resistance	 to	policy	 change	might	turn	into	resistance	to	the	polity	itself.	The	implication	of	this	claim	is	twofold.	First,	 it	echoes	our	assumption	that	 there	 is	no	clear-cut	separation	between	opposition	to	EU	policies	or	opposition	to	the	EU	polity.	This	is	the	starting	point	underlying	the	focus	on	policy	change.	A	second	implication	relates	to	the	form	of	resistance	to	the	EU	and	the	arena	 in	which	 it	 is	 likely	 to	be	expressed.	 In	other	words,	 if	 the	political	opportunity	structure	does	not	allow	to	channel	discontent	towards	EU	induced	policy	change	within	the	multi-level	governance	system,	it	is	likely	to	find	its	expression	in	a	more	adversarial	fashion	at	the	domestic	level.		This	process	of	contentious	‘arenas	shifting’	is	illustrated	by	the	intergovernmental	turn,	which	 occurred	 during	 the	 financial	 and	 debt	 crisis.	 In	 the	 policy	 arenas	 mentioned	above,	the	co-decision	procedure	offers	channelling	for	political	resistance.	Similarly,	the	recent	 contestation	 against	 the	Counterfeiting	Agreement	 (ACTA)	 or	 the	Transatlantic	Trade	 and	 Investment	 Partnership	 (TTIP)	 shows	 that	 resistance	 to	 policy	 change.	 In	
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many,	but	not	all	EU	member	states	–	examples	being	Poland,	Hungary	or	Slovakia	-,	the	framing	 in	 these	debates	has	often	been	one	 critical	 of	neoliberal	 inclinations	 and	 the	undemocratic	nature	of	the	EU.	However,	the	involvement	of	the	EP	and	has	provided	a	channel	for	the	expression	of	resistance.	Consequently,	critics	of	such	agreements	have	organized,	to	a	significant	extent,	at	the	EU	level.	In	contrast,	most	key	decisions	during	the	Eurocrisis	 (the	 establishment	 of	 financial	 solidarity	 funds,	 the	 banking	union,	 etc)	have	been	discussed	 and	made	 in	 intergovernmental	 arenas.	 The	EP	 and	other	 actors	representing	citizen	and	civil	society’s	interests	have	been	largely	marginalised.	Popular	discontent	 with	 austerity	 policies	 is	 now	mainly	 expressed	 in	 a	 scattered	manner	 by	unions,	or	movements	 (such	as	Occupy,	 the	 indignados,	etc)	which,	although	 targeting	the	EU	as	a	whole,	have	mainly	 taken	place	at	 the	domestic	 level	 in	an	uncoordinated	manner	(Kaldor	and	Selchow	forthcoming).	These	movements	have	led	to	change	in	the	political	 majority	 of	 a	 number	 of	 member	 states,	 as	 the	 elections	 in	 Italy,	 France,	Danemark,	Sweden	or	Spain	since	2013	have	illustrated.	Thus,	this	provides	grounds	for	a	third	‘arena	shifting’	hypothesis:		
H3:	 	The	lack	of	a	European	level	public	and	political	sphere	leads	to	resistances	at	the	domestic	level.			
The	consequences	of	resistance	The	 third	 crucial	 puzzle	 related	 to	 resistance	 to	 policy	 change	 in	 the	 EU	 refers	 to	 the	implications	 of	 resistance.	 In	 other	 words	 we	 are	 interested	 in	 why	 and	 how	 policy	change	brings	about	resistance	but	also	in	how	resistance	feeds	back	into	possible	policy	making	 at	 the	 EU	 level.	 Beyond	 mere	 issues	 of	 policy	 non-adoption	 or	 non-
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implementation,	 resistance	 to	policy	 change	 in	 the	EU	 also	has	major	 implications	 for	the	 integration	 process	 as	 a	 whole,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 way	 the	 EU	 is	 currently	dramatically	affected	by	the	European	debt	crisis.			In	 a	 large-scale	 quantitative	 study,	 Toshkov	 (2011)	 analysed	 the	 link	 between	 policy	making	activity	and	public	support	 for	the	EU	for	the	period	1973-2008.	He	concludes	that	policy	change	–	measured	as	the	policy	output	–	in	the	EU	followed	the	“ebbs	and	flows”	 of	 public	 support	 of	 EU	 citizens	 for	 the	 EU	 until	 the	 mid-1990s.	 Hence,	 if	resistance	occurs	at	 the	domestic	 level,	 two	years	 later	 legislative	output	 is	 smaller	at	the	EU	 level.	On	 the	contrary,	 if	public	 support	 for	 the	EU	 is	high,	 legislative	output	 is	higher,	 again	 with	 a	 two	 years	 delay.	 Since	 the	 mid-1990s,	 the	 high	 level	 of	unemployment,	on	the	contrary,	influences	governments’	positions	to	a	higher	degree	as	support	of	citizens	for	the	EU.	While	this	study’s	findings	are	interesting,	the	fact	that	it	does	 neither	 take	 domestic	 policy	 debates	 into	 account	 when	 measuring	 legislative	output,	 nor	 international	 debates,	 nor	 looks	 at	 the	 type	 of	 legislative	 output	 is	 highly	problematic.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 that	 since	 the	 mid-1990s,	 this	correlation	 no	 longer	 exists,	 which	 leads	 to	 the	 question	 whether,	 perhaps,	 the	Eurobarometer	measures	changed	at	this	period.	Besides	 decision-making,	 effects	 of	 resistance	 to	 policy	 change	 can	 be	 detected	 at	 the	various	moments	of	the	policy	cycle.	At	the	stage	of	agenda	setting,	actors	are	aware	that	framing	 and	 re-framing	 strategies	 will	 decisively	 shape	 the	 future	 course	 for	 policy	change.	Here,	resistance	can	impact	the	circumscription	of	policy	issues	and,	most	of	the	time,	this	has	an	effect	on	whether	political	and	administrative	elements	will	be	involved	
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in	the	discussion	or	not.	At	the	stage	of	policy	formulation,	resistance	may	obstruct	the	entire	policy	process	and	stop	 it.	During	an	entire	decade	between	the	mid-1990s	and	the	mid-2000s,	a	framework	directive	for	the	re-regulation	of	public	services	at	the	EU	level	 was	 on	 the	 agenda	 of	 all	 EU	 institutions.	 After	 lengthy	 discussions	 on	 the	Commission’s	Green	and	White	papers,	 resistance	 to	positive	 integration	on	 this	 issue	among	the	member	states	as	well	as	within	the	EP	led	the	Commission	to	not	make	any	legislative	proposal	on	this	issue	(Crespy	forthcoming).		These	 effects	 also	 imply	 larger	 feedback	 loops	 affecting	 further	 policy	 change	 and,	potentially,	the	integration	process	as	a	whole.	Resistance	at	the	domestic	level,	whether	this	refers	to	non-compliance	with	EU	law,	debates	over	policy	proposals	before	they	are	introduced	 by	 the	 Commission,	 or	 the	 resistance	 to	 general	 norms	 without	 judicial	control	 such	 as	 new	 economic	 governance	 provisions,	 backfires	 into	 debates	 at	 the	European	 level.	 This	 also	 involves	 soft	 rules	 and	 policy	 programs.	 The	 policy	orientations	entailed	in	the	Lisbon	strategy	are	a	good	example.	The	mid-term	review	of	the	strategy	in	2005	shed	light	on	the	implementation	shortfalls	 in	the	member	states.	This	 not	 only	 resulted	 in	 the	 re-orientation	 of	 the	 strategy,	 it	 also	 fed	 a	 general	scepticism	as	to	the	possibility	of	driving	coordinated	macro-economic	change	through	voluntary	 policy	 programs.	 Even	 more	 dramatically,	 the	 recent	 debates	 about	 the	governance	of	the	Eurozone	have	become	a	case	in	point	for	understanding	such	feed-back	 loops.	Some	Member	States,	 starting	with	France,	have	most	of	 the	 time	 failed	 to	meet	the	benchmarks	in	terms	of	public	deficits	and	debt	enshrined	in	the	Stability	and	Growth	 Pact	 (Howarth	 2007).	 In	 addition,	 the	 seeming	 compliance	 of	 Southern	European	 countries	 with	 the	 ‘duties’	 associated	 with	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 common	
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currency	has	now	made	decision	makers	and	public	opinion	reluctant	to	favour	further	integration	and	solidarity	within	the	Eurozone.		It	is	therefore	necessary	to	connect	the	issue	of	arenas	with	that	of	the	consequences	of	resistance,	 which	 is	 possible	 on	 two	 levels.	 A	 first,	 vertical,	 level	 refers	 to	 resistance	expressed	 during	 bargaining	 amongst	 EU	 member	 states.	 Here,	 resistance	 processes	contribute	to	shape	the	boundaries	of	the	EU	polity	in	a	way	that	can	be	limitative	and	lead	 to	 a	 halt	 of	 the	 integration	process.	 For	 example,	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 large	number	 of	member	 states	 does	 not	 wish	 to	 go	 ahead	 with	 further	 integration	 in	 the	 field	 of	economic	and	social	policy	makes	the	EU	mainly	a	regulatory	state	deprived	of	welfare	state	capacities.	Hence,	it	shapes	and	put	limits	of	integration	but	does	not	question	it.	In	contrast,	the	possibility	of	a	“Grexit”	(an	exit	of	Greece	from	the	EU),	much	more	than	a	possible	 “Brexit”	 can	be	regarded	as	an	example	showing	how	the	absence	of	political	fora	 for	 discussing	 political	 options	 at	 the	 EU	 level	 has	 led	 to	 the	 alienation	 of	 one	member	 state	 against	 the	 others.	 Similarly,	 the	 immigration	 debate	 in	 the	 UK	 and	resistance	towards	the	 free	movement	 in	the	EU	is	a	main	motive	 for	British	voters	to	withdraw	their	support	to	membership	in	the	EU.	In	both	cases,	resistance	to	EU	policies	in	 particular	 member	 states	 leads	 to	 the	 alienation	 of	 national	 constituencies.	 This	overlap	 between	 the	 perimeter	 of	 resistance	 and	 national	 membership	 holds	 strong	potential	for	European	disintegration,	whether	because	some	existing	policies	will	have	to	be	 altered	 to	keep	members	 in	or	because	 it	 can	potentially	 lead	 to	 the	 exit	 of	 one	member.			However,	policy	resistance	and	 its	effects	also	seem	 increasingly	 transferred	 from	one	member	 state	 to	 another	 (‘horizontal	 issue	 transfer),	 on	a	 second,	horizontal,	 level.	 In	
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highly	 salient	policy	 issues,	EU	heads	of	 state	and	government	are	 cautious	 in	making	their	position	known	before	monitoring	events	in	other	member	states	and	considering	how	 these	 events	 might	 feed	 back	 on	 their	 own	 constituency.	 Greece’s	 President	Papandreou’s	call	for	a	referendum,	leading	to	his	resignation	in	November	2011,	serves	as	an	illustration	of	this	monitoring	of	effects:	why	would	France	and	Germany	force	the	Greek	Prime	Minister	Papandreou	to	choose	between	the	referendum,	on	the	one	hand,	and	 staying	 in	 the	 euro	 and	 receiving	 further	 financial	 support,	 on	 the	 other,	 at	 the	Cannes	G20	meeting	in	October	2011,	but	then	not	do	so	in	2015	when	the	new	Prime	Minister	 Alexis	 Tsipras	 announced	 a	 referendum	 on	 precisely	 the	 same	 question?	Neither	in	2011,	nor	in	2015	was	it	possible	for	a	national	head	of	state	or	government	to	dismiss	the	public	opinion	of	another	member	state.	But	in	2015,	doing	so	would	have	meant	 the	 political	 opinion	 of	 the	 Greek	 citizens	would	 contest	 European	 integration	forcefully	 enough	 to	 push	 the	 Greek	 government	 to	 consider	 openly	 its	 exit	 of	 the	Eurozone.	 Hence,	 on	 highly	 salient	 issues,	 we	 can	 suppose	 that	 domestic	 debates,	organised	interests	and	the	public	opinion	in	other	member	states	influence	the	position	of	member	states	in	bargaining	(see	also	Meyer	2004).		These	propositions	can	be	analysed	in	the	light	of	institutional	possibilities	for	particular	actors	 to	 use	 a	 veto.	 In	 the	 framework	 of	 co-decision,	 or	 (qualified)	 majorities	 more	broadly,	 if	 resistance	 is	 concentrated	 in	 one	 (or	 few)	 member	 states	 without	 the	possibility	of	horizontal	issue	transfer,	it	can	be	overcome	by	other	members.		In	turn,	if	it	is	a	majority	position,	it	will	shape	future	policy	change	more	strongly.		
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This	leads	us	our	last	and	fourth	‘concentration’	hypothesis,	which	takes	a	twofold	form	according	to	the	institutional	rules	of	the	game.		
H4a:	Under	the	unanimity	regime,	the	more	resistance	is	concentrated	in	one	member	state,	 the	 stronger	 the	 effects	 will	 be	 in	 terms	 of	 disintegration	 of	 the	 EU	 policies	 or	polity.		
H4b:	 Under	 the	majority	 regime,	 the	more	 resistance	 is	 concentrated	 in	 one	member	state	without	the	possibility	of	‘horizontal	issue	transfer’,	the	weaker	its	effects	will	be.			
Conclusion	
Over	the	past	two	decades,	a	new	research	agenda	on	the	various	forms	of	resistance	to	EU	integration	has	been	emerging.	 	The	recent	developments	 in	the	EU,	this	paper	has	argued,	however,	 call	 for	 a	new	and	 refined	approach	 to	 analysing	 resistance.	Beyond	mere	nationalism,	 resistance	 to	EU	 integration	 is	 fed	by	 the	perception	of	detrimental	policy	 change	 among	 various	 social	 groups	 and	 actors.	 While	 the	 debt	 crisis	 in	 the	Eurozone	epitomizes	this	phenomenon,	 this	has	also	been	true	 for	 immigration	policy,	market	liberalisation	in	various	sectors	or	adjustments	to	the	welfare	State	triggered	by	the	 ‘convergence’	 towards	 the	Maastricht	 criteria.	We	 therefore	 suggest	 going	beyond	principled	 Euroscepticism	 research,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 non-compliance	 studies,	 on	the	 other,	 by	 considering	 that	 resistance	 to	 EU	 integration	 is	 principally	 directed	 to	policy	change	perceived	as	detrimental	by	agency	and	that	it	is	the	result	of	contention	and	 politics.	 Drawing	 on	 various	 approaches	 and	 recent	 studies,	 the	 proposed	framework	 examines	 the	 causes	 and	 the	 effects	 of	 resistance	 to	 EU	 induced	 policy	
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change.	 To	 explain	 the	 causes	 of	 such	 resistance,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 examine	not	 only	 the	direction	of	change	(more	or	less	market	freedom,	more	or	less	centralisation	at	the	EU	level),	but	also	the	way	change	is	perceived	and	framed	by	the	affected	agents,	as	well	as	the	 influence	of	 feedback	 loops.	We	derive	 four	hypotheses	 that	 connect	 the	nature	of	change	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 resistance	 to	 change.	 The	 effects	 of	 policy	 resistance	 take	multiple	forms	and	are	closely	linked	to	questions	of	the	democratic	legitimacy	of	every	political	system	(van	Ingelgom	2014).		This	 framework	 advances	 our	 understanding	 of	 resistance	 to	 policy	 change	 by	systematically	combining	what	we	know	about	Europeanisation	and	policy	change	with	the	knowledge	 about	 the	multi-level	 politics	 in	 the	EU.	 It	 offers	 several	 analytical	 and	conceptual	 tools,	which	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 all	 types	 of	 actors	 and	 policy	 areas.	 Only	 a	more	structured,	encompassing,	and	systematic	analysis	of	resistance	to	policy	change	will	allow	us	to	understand	where	the	European	project	as	a	whole	is	heading.				
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1	Although	Toshkov’s	 taking	stock	exercise	 is	exclusively	based	on	quantitative	non-compliance	studies,	the	variables	consistently	reflect	those	found	in	qualitative	studies.	
